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[W]hy the United States hated? --- ‘It’ is not ---. The ‘United States’ must be disaggregated. --- [I]t is the policies of successive US governments that are so hated: the manner in which the world’s sole superpower tends always to get its way; its sometimes brutal foreign policy and profitable project of globalization; its support for tyrants while mouthing the language of democracy and human rights; and the way it uses local proxies to dominate the global order. However benign the US hegemon, it will be feared because it is drawn as no other power into the daily business of running the world, and it will get its way. In any human situation, such structural power tends to provoke the hostility of those who are not listened to, or who do not get their way, ever. (p. 2)

Ignorance and myth can breed self-righteousness --- a dangerous foundation on which to engage with the world. The moral high ground is where ethnocentric memories reside. And here, also, is where there are so many similarities between Bush presidency and the Reagan era. In both cases there is a gap between the self-image of standing firm for liberty, democracy, international law and peace, while conducting policies characterized by inconsistency on free trade, the support of tyrants, economic imperialism, play fast and loose with international law, when necessary, being ready, willing and able to use violence. (p. 3)

If power is part of the problem with the Untied States, it is lack of power that besets Islam. In various contexts in recent years, Muslims have been on the receiving end of world politics. (pp. 3-4)

What we have suggested here --- is the critical point that we are not confronted today by a simple ‘clash of civilizations.’ What we have instead is a confusion of misunderstandings, crude stereotypes, and parallel absences of self-knowledge. (p. 5)

It would be an error of historic proportions to exaggerate the incompatibilities between the thought-worlds of the so-called West and the so-called Rest. We in the West may not be able to understand the thinking of the mass murderers of September 11, but few in the rest of the world could comprehend their motives either. --- Mohammed Atta’s mindset was no more comprehensible to the Arab street than that of Timothy McVeigh had been to the American suburb. All this suggests that the image of the West and the Rest should be challenged. This metanarratives reifies ‘the West’ and other groupings as if they are the categorical realities of world politics. Again, life is more complex, except for the terrorist. (pp. 7-8)

Terrorism collides with notions of politics grounded in democratic values. In an ideal polity, political action is based on dialogue, one in which participants rationally seek to persuade others of the universal validity of their moral beliefs. Those holding values and beliefs that are at odds with the majority are listened to, free of the fear of violence; questions of cultural difference are negotiated within a framework of equality. Even if the war against terrorism succeeds in defeating the al-Qaeda network, it will not bring about resolution to the political problems that they have exploited. This can only be achieved by nurturing the values that collide with fear, hatred and a willingness to commit any acts in the hope of changing the course of history. Here there is a responsibility on all actors involved in the current conflagration to encourage voices of moderation, human rights and religious toleration. (p. 10)

There may have been no alternative to a military response acceptable to the vast majority of US citizens, but by choosing warfighting rather crimefighting, critics of US policy argued that it risked reproducing the logic of the terrorists. When we persuade ourselves that war is the only way of prevailing (as the jihadists have), we become self-righteous about our cause (as Islamists are about theirs), and we risk blurring the distinction between warriors and non-combatants (as al-Qaeda has done with its instruction ‘to kill the Americans and their allies’). This is not to suggest a moral equivalence between those responsible for the terrorist atrocities of September 11, and those leading the war against terrorism. Rather, it is a warning that victims all to often become bullies. With this in mind it is crucial to think not only about what our military actions might do to the enemy, but also about what they are doing to us. (p. 13)

September 11 has begun a new chapter in the historic rivalry between states and non-state actors. --- One of the striking aspects of the attacks on the US was the manner in which many of the settled norms of the so-called Westphalian system of states was unhinged. The enemy was not a state, and their immediate aim was not to acquire territory but to alter the ideological balance of power. --- The means of fighting this war are also significantly different from historic pattern of interstate rivalry. Violence is not carried out directly by agents of the state, and the target is not opposing armies but civilians. (pp. 13-14)

September 11 illustrates the process by which state power is evinced by transnational networks and the concomitant attempt by states to reassert the primacy of the interstate realm. --- Under the influence of the propaganda of hyperglobalization, many have been dazzled by non-state actors. September 11 underlines the continuing power of states. Al-Qaeda has flourished in places where state structures are either weak or non-existent. Funded by other states and private actors, al-Qaeda was able to establish itself in Afghanistan and the Yemen by brokering deals with the governments to aid them in their own civil wars. --- In this sense, 9/11 and the global war on terror have not fundamentally altered the dynamic interplay of territoriality and transnationalism. (pp. 14-15)

Timescale is a traditional way of distinguishing mere politicians from great statesman. For the former, problem solving means attending to today’s agenda, and the next election. For great leaders, today’s problems are not the real ones. This distinction shades into a difference of approach based on concern for symptoms as opposed to causes. In this respect, the overwhelming priority for the White House has been to attend to the symptoms, by seeking out the terrorists responsible for the attacks and threatening those who harbour them. In the short term this strategy has been more successful than its proponents could have predicted. (p. 18)

Some security measures of course should be taken, for many terrorist are beyond both appeasement and deterrence, but if terrorism is simply matched by escalating violence, then fear will be sovereign in world affairs, and the terrorists will have won some sort of victory. --- When fear rules, it is not difficult to offer pessimistic scenarios for the months and years ahead. (p. 19)

In a traditional war, victory is assured by the occupying of ground; in a global war against terrorism not only has territory to be occupied in some sense globally, but also hearts an minds have to be own over. US strategy is gradually spreading its infrastructure of military power across the world in pursuit of the former; its diplomacy is not so far proving as effective in the latter. Although the assertion of US power seems to have been successful in the short run, --- victory is remote. (p. 20)

Rather than letting terrorism win, by allowing fear to be sovereign, terrorism can be defeated today (if not yet eradicated) by employing the means, however imperfectly, that are the moral equivalent of the ends we seek. --- In addition to taking necessary security measures, the means [that] approach to victory involves a steady commitment on the part of the world’s dominant states to behave as if law is not just an instrument of the powerful, as if the humanizing of globalization is a priority, and as if the creation of a global human rights culture will be the consequence of dialogue not diktat. --- If the goal of policy is restricted to one of national security, narrowly defined, then we can say that September 11 was not only our shared yesterday, but risks also being all our tomorrows. (p. 21)

Chapter 2, Francis Fukuyama, "History and September 11"

More than ten years ago, I argued that we had reached the ‘end of history’: not that historical events would stop, but that History understood as the evolution of human societies through different forms of government had culminated in modern liberal democracy and market-oriented capitalism. It is my view that this hypothesis remains correct, despite the events since September 11: modernity, as represented by the United States and other developed democracies, will remain the dominant force in world politics, and the institutions embodying the West’s underlying principles of freedom and equality will continue to spread around the world. (pp. 27-28)

There are, in fact, reasons for believing that Western values and institutions are immediately appealing to many if not most non-Western people. --- Western institutions are like the scientific method, which, though discovered in the West, has universal applicability. There is an underlying historical mechanism that encourages a long-term convergence across cultural boundaries, first and most powerfully in economics, then in the realm of politics and finally (and most distantly) in culture. (p. 29)

What drives this process forward in the first instance [=economics] is modern science and technology, whose ability to create material wealth and weapons of war is so great that virtually all societies must come to terms with it. --- [T]he need to master it [=modern technology] necessitates the adoption of certain economic institutions, like free markets and the rule of law, that promote growth. Modern technology-driven market economies thrive on individual freedom --- that is a system where individuals rather than governments or priests make decisions on prices or rates or interest.

Economic development in turn tends to engender liberal democracy --- not inevitably, but often enough that the correlation between development and democracy constitutes one of the few generally accepted ‘laws’ of political science. Economic growth produces a middle class with property rights, a complex civil society and ever higher levels of education to maintain economic competitiveness. All these factors together create fertile ground in which demands for democratic political participation take shape, which eventually get institutionalized in democratic government.

Culture --- religious beliefs, social habits, longstanding traditions --- is the last area of convergence, and also the weakest. Societies are loath to give up deeply rooted values, and it would be extremely na?ve to think that American popular culture, seductive as it is, will soon engulf the entire world. --- But while cultural differences remain in modern societies, they tend to be put in a box, separated from politics, and relegated to the realm of private life. The reason for this is simple: if politics is based on something like religion, there will never be any civil peace because people cannot agree on fundamental religious values. --- The separation of church and state became a necessary component of modernization precisely because of the need for civil peace ---.

This underlying logic of modernization suggests that Western values are not just arbitrary cultural offshoots of Western Christianity, but do embody a more universal process. (pp. 29-30)

It is doubtful that there is something inherent in Islam as a religion that makes it hostile to modernity. --- The Islamic world differs from other world cultures today in one important respect. In recent years it alone has repeatedly produced significant radical movements that reject not just Western policies but the most basic principle of modernity itself, that of religious tolerance. --- So this is not simple a ‘war’ against terrorists, as the American and British governments understandably portray it. --- [T]he present conflict is not simply a fight against terrorism, nor against Islam as a religion or civilization, but rather with Islamo-fascism --- that is the radically intolerant and anti-modern doctrine that has recently arisen in many parts of the Muslim world. (pp. 31-32)

The Islamic world is at the juncture today where Christian Europe stood during the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century: religious politics is driving potentially endless conflict, not just between Muslims and non-Muslims but between different sects of Muslims. In an age of biological and nuclear weapons, this could lead to disaster for everyone. (p. 34)

The struggle between Western liberal democracy and Islamo-fascism is not one between two equally viable cultural systems, both of which can master modern science and technology, create wealth and deal with the de facto diversity of the contemporary world. In all these respects, Western institutions hold all the cards and for that reason will continue to spread across the globe in the long run. But to get to the long run we must survive the short run. And unfortunately, there is no inevitability to historical progress, and few good outcomes absent leadership, courage and a determination to fight for values that make modern democratic societies possible. (p. 35)

Chapter 5, Desmond Ball, “Desperately Seeking Bin Laden: The Intelligence Dimension of the War Against Terrorism”

The current role of emails and the internet in terrorist communications networks, the extensive use of emails by the hijackers in their preparations for the September 11 attacks, and the increasing use by terrorist groups of advanced encryption techniques (including stenography, in which encrypted messages are concealed inside music or picture files on websites) have prompted various initiatives to increase the powers and capabilities of agencies involved in electronic surveillance, and have renewed the arguments concerning the delicate balance between national security and privacy issues. --- The demands for the banning of encryption of email --- are especially problematic. None of the emails sent or received by the hijackers was encrypted. (pp. 69-70)

The prospective increase in capabilities and legal powers for electronic surveillance will not reduce the fallibility of the intelligence community. Even if all of the emails and internet communications of the hijackers now collected had been processed and analysed beforehand by come central authority, it would still probably not have revealed their precise intentions. But a central authority able to assemble and scrutinize electronic communications of all sorts would certainly involve gross infringements of civil liberties. (p. 72)

Chapter 6, Thomas J. Biersteker, “Targeting Terrorist Finances: The New Challenges of Financial Market Globalization”

Prior to September 11, 2001, most of the discussion about the challenges of financial market globalization concerned its distributional effects and its tendency toward periodic instability (financial fragility). --- After September 11, 2001, much of the discussion about negative (or ‘dark’) side of financial market globalization turned away from its distributional effects and tendency toward periodic instability and began to consider how it facilitated the transfer of funds that enabled global terrorism. Money laundering and the operations of transnational criminal organization has long been identified as side-effects of financial market globalization, but most of the negative consequences associated with these practices seemed to have been more than offset by the general benefits of financial market integration. September 11 changed all of that. Never before had any transnational actor inflicted damage with such a direct --- and lethal --- effect. The new challenge of financial market globalization was how to track and freeze the financial assets of global terrorist network. --- Global terrorism presents a new security threat --- that of a networked, transnational actor. (pp. 75-76)

There are a number of things that have been learned from efforts to target financial sanctions that are directly relevant to the effort to freeze and suppress the generation and movement of funds that support global terrorism. First, and foremost, given the fact that terrorism is a global problem, responses to it require multilateral cooperation. Clarity and consistency of definition and interpretation across different national legal jurisdictions are vital. ---

Second, because private sector financial institutions are on the front lines of implementation of both targeted financial sanctions and efforts to block terrorist finances, they need to be protected from potential claims arising from their compliance with UN Security Council resolutions and other enabling obligations. If they are not provide with this legal protection, the freezing of funds could cause a financial institution to be in violation of its fundamental obligations to its customers. ---

Third, experience with efforts to target financial sanctions suggests the UN Security Council resolutions or national enabling legislation to block or freeze the assets of terrorist organizations should authorize financial institutions to trace funds retroactively. Requiring states to report on the movement of funds within their jurisdiction for a specified period prior to efforts to freeze or block the movement of terrorist funds could generate valuable information about the location and movement of financial assets attempting to flee a jurisdiction. Thus, even if the funds cannot be trapped, they can be traced, enabling monitoring of the assets, if and when they attempt to re-enter the global financial system. ---

Fourth, efforts to target financial sanctions also suggest that national agencies engaged in international efforts to combat global terrorism need to provide as much identifying information as possible about the targets of the resolutions and enabling legislation. --- Providing more identifying information about potential targets requires multilateral cooperation, including the sharing and coordination of intelligence information. Intelligence coordination is especially important for identifying the potential use of the hawala system, since it is not as susceptible to electronic surveillance as the formal banking system.

Fifth, while broad-based cooperation is necessary for an effective global effort to combat terrorism, the experience with targeting financial sanctions has taught that most countries lack an adequate administrative capacity to implement UN Security Council resolutions effectively. --- Given the urgency of the threat posed by global terrorist organizations, there is a pressing need for dissemination of ‘best practice’ to offshore financial centers and to the countries most likely to be transit points for terrorist funds.

Sixth, and finally, the computer technology that enables global terrorist networks to exploit financial market globalization and move funds instantaneously across the globe can also be employed against them. Financial institutions throughout the world could be encouraged to utilize one of the many ‘name recognition’ software programs already widely available on the market. --- The use of computerized surveillance technology raises important and legitimate concerns about the potential violation of fundamental civil liberties from this new form of electronic intrusion. However, new norms can be introduced that establish limits on the invasion of privacy and procedures for petition for removal from erroneous inclusion on the list of terrorists. (pp. 78-81)

Among the most effective strategies of defense against a global terrorist network is the development of a networked response. Transnational network need to be mobilized, global civil society needs to be engaged and private sector financial institutions need to be employed to suppress or freeze the financial assets of terrorist networks. (p. 83)

Chapter 7, Barry Buzan, “Who May We Bomb?”

The idea that in war, peoples and their governments should be treated separately, has recently become something of a Western fetish, a way of assessing the West’s claim to be civilized. ---

Three factors have contributed to the West’s new policy of separating bad governments from their peoples. The first hinges on advances in technology. Since the 1970s, and increasingly over the past decade, it has become possible to deliver warheads with great accuracy to a target. Precision weapons now provide choices about what is and what is not targeted that were not available earlier wars. This does make a difference, but one side-effect of the ‘revolution in military affairs’ (RMA) has been to establish unrealistic public expectations of precision in the use of force. Any collateral damage is used by Western critics, and even by target regimes, to cast moral doubt on military action.

The second factor is an evolution in public morality in the West, which at least since the abolition of slavery has been increasingly committed to the idea that all peoples have the right to equal and decent treatment. By combining its technology and its values, the West is able to project its values by injecting an element of law and humanitarianism into the bloody business of war.

Third, Western governments calculate that narrowing the definition of enemy to evil leaderships is in their interests. In the mosaic of historically rooted cultural conflicts that replaced the big ideological divisions of the Cold War, separating peoples from their leaderships during war has many advantages. It moderates charges of cultural imperialism, of one civilization (usually the West) trying to impose its values on others, and it invites the overthrow of tyrants from within, thus keeping open the option of a people remaking itself and gaining quick re-entry into international society. If people can be made to do some or all of the work of removing their bad governments, then the West’s casualties are reduced and the legitimacy of both the action and its outcome are increased. (pp. 85-87)

This [= the question of whether people get the governments they deserve ] brings us back to the question of whether the current Western habit of separating peoples from their leaders makes for better or worse war policy. There can be no doubt that it constraints the sort of military pressure that can be brought to bear. --- Where people do not deserve the government they get, separating the two as far as possible must be imperative in any war policy.

But what of cases where peoples do deserve their governments? --- The problem is that if people really deserve their government, and yet only the government is targeted, the country as a whole remains politically unreconstructed and thus a continuing danger to itself and to the international community. --- The crushing defeat of both states and peoples in Germany and Japan in the Second World War was instrumental in converting those countries into liberal democracies able to fit comfortably into the international community of the West. The remaking of the two countries is rightly regarded as a huge success and played a big role in the victory of the West in the Cold War. ---

To delink people from their governments, when they are in fact closely linked, is to undermine the political point of resorting to war in the first place. In the end, war is about changing people’s minds about what sort of government they want. (pp. 90-91)

Pacifists and the more dedicated type of humanitarians will find these arguments about applied violence unacceptable. A case can be made that the answer to ‘Who may we bomb?’ should be ‘Nobody.’ The argument made above is only for those who believe that war still has a role to play in a complex, interdependent and conflictual world, and that that role needs to be both carefully constrained and fully considered. The military strategy and the political logic of war require careful specification of who the enemy is. A blanket assumption that all civilians are innocent will often not be justified. Whether or not people deserve their governments can be a tough question, but answers to it have to be found if ideas about humanitarian intervention are ever to acquire intellectual and political coherence. International society has the right to confront governments and peoples that pose unacceptable threats to peace. If force is going to be used against a country in pursuit of civilizational objects, the question of citizen responsibility has to be answered before appropriate military strategies can be devised. If the people clearly do not deserve the government they get, then military strategy must be devised as far as possible to target only the state and its army --- as has been the case in recent Western interventions. But if people do deserve the government they get, and if that government is in gross breach of standards of civilization, then, as in the Second World War, the war should be against both government and people. (p. 93).

Chapter 8, Immanuel Wallerstein, “Mr. Bush’s War on Terrorism: How Certain is the Outcome?”

Shortly after the attack of September 11 by al-Qaeda against the Twin Towers in New York and the Pentagon, President Bush addressed the US Congress, declaring a ‘war on terrorism’ and saying, among other things, that ‘its outcome is certain.’ Is this true? (p. 95)

The basic problem with the Bush strategy is the audacious and very hard to believe assumption that the US can control all the crucial variables in a chaotic world situation. ---

Of course, one cannot conduct a war against terrorists. One can try wipe them out, if one is strong enough. Given the loose and inclusive definition the US government is now giving the term ‘terrorism.’ it seems highly improbable that this would be achieved. (p. 99)

Chapter 9, James Der Derian, “In Terrorem : Before and After 9/11”

More than a rational calculation of interests takes us to war. People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine and speak of others; that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the sameness of themselves through representation. (p. 110)

Chapter 10, Michael Byers, “Terror and the Future of International Law”

One regularly hears talk of a ‘democratic deficit’ with regard to supranational institutions such as the UN and the EU, but perhaps it is time to start speaking of a similar deficit with regard to the US [unilateralism]. The importance of decisions made in Washington today eclipse that of decisions made in the UN --- and not just for Americans. Citizens of other countries find themselves in a position of considerable historical irony: the victims of a twenty-first-century form of ‘taxation without representation,’ subject to the governance of a foreign power but deprived of any voice.

Maintaining the integrity and equal application of the international legal system is the most effective way in which we can begin to address this problem. --- It is high time that more of the United States’ friends made themselves heard, and insisted that the immense power of the US be challenged through existing international rules and institutions, and thus used to improve the world --- for everyone. (p. 127)

Chapter 11, Noam Chomsky, “Who Are the Global Terrorists?”

The condemnations of terrorism are sound, but leave some questions unanswered. The first is ‘What do we mean by “terrorism”?’ Second, ‘What is the proper response to the crime? Whatever the answer, it must at least satisfy a moral truism: if we propose some principle that is to be applied to antagonists, then we must agree --- in fact, strenuously insist --- that the principle apply to us as well. Those who do not rise even to this minimal level of integrity plainly cannot be taken seriously when they speak of right and wrong, good and evil. (p. 128)

The problem of definition is held to be vexing and complex. There are, however, proposals that seem straightforward, for example, in US Army manuals, which define terrorism as ‘the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political, religious, or ideological in nature … through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear.’ (p. 128)

Evidently, we have to qualify the definition of ‘terrorism’ given in official sources: the term applies only to terrorism against us, not the terrorism we carry out against them. (p. 131)

Washington waged its ‘war on terrorism’ by creating an international terror network of unprecedented scale, and employing it worldwide with lethal and long-lasting effects. (p. 132)

If we keep to official definitions, it is a serious error to describe terrorism as the weapon of the weak. Like most weapons, it is wielded to far greater effect by the strong. But then it is not terror: rather ‘counter-terror.’ or ‘low-intensity warfare’ or ‘self-defense; and, if successful, ‘rational’ and ‘pragmatic,’ and an occasion to be ‘united in joy.’ (p. 135)

Chapter 12, Robert O. Keohane, “The Public Delegitimation of Terrorism and Coalition Politics”

One result of September 11 attacks has been the public delegitimation of terrorism. By ‘public delegitimation’ I don not mean that people everywhere have suddenly renounced their support of terrorism to achieve political objectives. What I do mean is that apparent support of terrorism can now be more effectively criticized and its supporters embarrassed. The great powers of the world --- the United States, the European Union, China and Russia --- all have good reasons to fear terrorism. None of them believes that it can achieve its own anti-terrorist objectives without supporting a global effort against terrorism. Hence, there is suddenly a broad coalition against terrorism based not only on American power, but on the perceived self-interest of other powerful states. (p. 141)

The thesis of this short chapter is twofold. In the short run, the public delegitimation of terrorism has changed the interests and positions of a variety of states in a way that affects both coalition formation and outcomes of political disputes. New coalitions and alignments are now emerging as state interests change in the wake of the actions of September 11. Adjustments are occurring in the relative power of various states and non-state movements, stemming from the public delegitimation of terrorism as a means of political action.

In the long term, terrorism recalls other forms of non-state violence --- notably piracy --- that thrived under certain conditions but were eventually eliminated by a combination of state action and changes in structures of opportunity. If the piracy analogy has any merit, there may be hope of sharply reducing the dangers from those forms of terrorism that operate transnationally with the support or tolerance of states. Such an accomplishment will depend, however, on the public delegitimation of terrorism becoming much more universal, as a result of increasing opportunities for otherwise frustrated people as well as effective state action. (p. 141-142)

Despite the wide consensus against terrorism, it is wise to remind ourselves that world politics is a competitive activity in which conflicts of interests are rife; hence the construction of a norm against terrorism is only the beginning of a political process, not the end. Given such a norm, much activity in world politics becomes a competition for specifying what the norm means. Who qualifies as a terrorist? Of what does ‘harbouring terrorists’ consist? Both militant non-state groups and states will seek to frame the issue in such a way that informal violence in which they engage, or that they support, is not defined as terrorism, while violence that they seek to combat is so defined. (pp. 142-143)

[A]n assumption [that only non-state actors can engage in terrorism] is questionable: ‘state terrorism’ is not an oxymoron. Yet the definition of terrorism with non-state actors gives all states --- including Israel --- an advantage over their non-state opponents. Since states control the discourses of international organizations, such organizations may be inclined to adopt, or implicitly to accept, definitions that privilege the behavior of states. --- How the issue is framed becomes crucial in the struggle to justify action. (p. 146)

Terrorism is a weapon of the weak, most useful to groups that are not powerful enough to confront their adversary in direct battle, or even to wage effective guerrilla warfare. It is also a weapon of the highly organized, the fanatical and those without moral scruples. The delegitimation of terrorism and effective war against it will strengthen powerful states, which are (apart from terrorism) able to police their borders and deter attacks by other states. It will also benefit democracies, which are both most vulnerable to terrorism due to their openness and least able to engage in it due to the secrecy involved and the dangers that supporting terrorist organization will undercut democracy itself. (pp. 148-149)

[T]he long-term political success of the ‘war against terrorism’ depends on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of practices as well as on military power, intelligence gathering and police work. To win the battle against transnational terrorism, transnational terrorism must become widely regarded illegitimate, as are slavery and piracy today. --- The deepening delegitimation of transnational terrorism is a necessary condition for its disappearance as a major force in world politics. (p. 151)

Chapter 13, Michael Cox, “Meaning of Victory: American Power After the Towers”

What the war [against terrorism] has done, basically, is to confirm that the Bush administration’s view that because stability in an uncertain world derives from power, then the best way of maintaining and sustaining a stable order is not through multilateral agreement, international treaties or international law, but through the threat or the use of force --- American force. From this perspective the problem is not that the US has too little power --- an argument frequently used in the past to explain why the international system might be under stress --- but that it now has too much. (p. 154)

When the war began there were those who hoped that this would curb the unilateralist inclinations of the Bush administration and that it would emerge on the other side converted to the cause of coalitions and multilateralism. In reality, the war has had almost the opposite effect. This might not please important European leaders; it may upset the United States’ allies; and it could in part be checked by those in the foreign policy bureaucracy who recognize that effective action on most issues requires cooperation. But the Unites States in its current mood appears little inclined to listen to such voices. (p. 160)

Chapter 19, Paul Rogers, “Political Violence and Global Order”

A frequently quoted definition of terrorism is ‘the threat of violence and the use of fear to coerce, persuade and gain public attention.’ --- An important aspect of such a definition is that it recognizes that terrorism and political violence are not the prerogative of substate groups. --- This elaboration is essential because state authorities concentrate almost exclusively on threats to their own power, whereas most terrorism is actually conducted by states against their own populations. --- On any scale of measurement, terrorism is primarily a function of the state, even if the greatest attention is currently given to substate terrorism against Western states. (pp. 215-216)

The three dominant drivers of conflict and insecurity over the next few decades are likely to be socioeconomic divisions, environmental constraints and proliferation of military technologies. (p. 216)

What is the relevance of the attacks of September 11 and their aftermath to the more general analysis of trends in international insecurity? --- First, the September 11 attacks did demonstrate in a horrifying manner the vulnerability of highly developed states to asymmetric paramilitary action. Second, al-Qaeda’s support stems, in part, from an opposition to the US military presence in the Gulf, boosted by disaffection from among the ‘demographic bulge’ of educated young people in the region. Finally, and most significant, the reaction of the United States has not been to address the core issues underlying the strength of this and other networks, but rather to seek to maintain control with great vigour and expand military force.

The more general analysis suggests that the core drivers of socioeconomic divisions and environmental constraints will lead to increased instability and conflict, much of it represented by an increasing tendency towards anti-elite insurgencies. --- The long-term result is likely to be a cycle, or perhaps a spiral, of violence between elites and radical anti-elite movements. (p. 223)

Chapter 20, Colin Gray, “World Politics as Usual After September 11”

What we have witnessed thus far in the military dimension of the war against those presumed to be guilty of September 11, has been technically impressive indeed. What we have not witnessed in the war to date is any convincing evidence that the realist world (dis)order is either undergoing some transformation, or is revealed to be conceptually deficient in satisfactory explanatory power. --- [M]y case is to the effect that the methods and content of statecraft are, and will remain, very substantially unchanged by the evidence of the new style in mass terrorism. It may be worth my mentioning the fact that if the actual (the First and Second World Wars and the Holocaust) and potential (a superpower nuclear Third World War) horrors of the twentieth century failed to effect radical change in the means and methods of world politics, it is hardly likely that isolated terroristic atrocities, no matter how televisual, would succeed in their turn. (p. 227)

Chapter 21, Fred Halliday, “A New Global Configuration”

There are two predictable, and nearly always mistaken, responses to any great international upheaval: one is to say that everything has changed; the other is to say that nothing has changed. --- September 11 did not ‘change everything’: the map of the world with its 200 or so states, the global pattern of economic and military power, the relative distribution of democratic, semi-authoritarian and tyrannical states remains much the same. --- Yet this recognition of continuity downplays the degree to which the attacks on the US ‘homeland’ have reshaped, or promise to reshape, the world in which we live. (p. 235)

[I]n summary term, there are at least five major ways in which the world after September 11, and the world that we could have anticipated had September 11 not happened, is now a different place.

First, there has been a marked increase in the focus and assertion of US power. The US was, prior to September 11, the dominant world power in every significant index, with the possible exception of football. Yet it was uncertain as to how to exert this, wavering between a multilateral approach, favoured by Clinton, ---, and the unilateral, which is not the same as isolationist, policy favoured by Bush. --- Yet [September 11] has both substantially reinforced the commitment of the US administration to asserting US power and, even more so, altered the mood within America to one of support for this course of action. ---

Equally importantly, however, September 11 has led much of the rest of the world to seek to work more closely with the US. --- Here lies the second of the great changes brought about by September 11: some US allies have moved further away, notably Saudi Arabia, but the overall diplomatic balance sheet has been to America’s advantage. ---

Against this, however, lies the third of the outcomes of September 11, the consolidation, to a degree latent but not present before that date, not of an alternative military or economic bloc but of something else, a global coalition of feeling against the U.S. --- At the level of popular feeling across the world, and not just in the Muslim world, a kind of countervailing balance of affect is taking shape. --- Loosely associated with globalization, this too will not easily go away. One of the greatest, and possibly most permanent, consequences of this crisis will lie in its reinforcement of anti-Americanism.

A fourth dimension is that of management of the global economy. September 11, by depressing certain important sectors of the market --- airlines, tourism, oil, insurance --- and by spreading a wider lack of confidence on the part of investors and consumers, has accentuated a trend towards recession that was already evident. --- The most important economic shift, above all, is that September 11 has brought the state, not least the US state, back into the management of the world economy: neo-liberal faith in the market, already frayed, has now been further eroded as the government of the developed world promise to subsidize ailing sectors, use fiscal adjustment and lower interest rates to offset the crisis. ---

In terms of regional power politics, the fifth dimension of change, the area most affected is that of West Asia. (pp. 236-238)

Over time, the consequences of September 11 will be decided by the factor that itself caused this crisis: politics, and of three broad kinds. The first is the politics of the US itself. The Bush administration in particular, and the US state in general, have in the short run emerged strengthened form this crisis. It remains to be seen what it does with this strength and how far it can sustain its new advantages. The second is the politics of the Middle East and of the Muslim world. It is unclear what this earthquake will bring down, or leave standing, but the tremors are substantial. Finally, there is the broader context, the coalition of states that has supported the US ‘war’ on terrorism, and the pervasive bloc of resentment that opposes it. These are sinews of globalization, the foci cooperation and opposition forged after September 11. Their long-term shape is by no means preordained. (pp. 240-241)

Chapter 22, Benjamin R. Barber. “Democracy and Terror in the Era of Jihad vs. McWorld”

The collision between forces of disintegral tribalism and reactionary fundamentalism I called Jihad (Islam was not the issue) and the forces of integrative modernization and aggressive economic and cultural globalization (the US was not alone responsible) I called McWorld in my Jihad vs. McWorld has been brutally exacerbated by the dialectical interdependence of these two seemingly oppositional sets of forces. In that critical examination of the relationship between globalization and fundamentalism, I warned that democracy, caught between a clash of movements each of which for its own reasons seemed indifferent to freedom’s fate, might suffer grievously. It is now apparent, as the US successfully concludes the first phase of a military offensive against Jihad (understood not as Islam but as militant fundamentalism), that democracy rather than terrorism may still become another victim of the battle being waged. (p. 245)

The struggle of Jihad against McWorld is not a clash of civilization but a dialectical expression of tensions built into a single global civilization as it emerges against a backdrop of traditional ethnic and religious divisions, many of which are actually created by McWorld and its infotainment industries and technological innovations. Bin Laden without modern media would have been an unknown desert rat. Terrorism without credit cards, global financial systems, modern technology and the internet would have been reduced to throwing stones at local sheiks. What we face is not a war of civilizations, but a war within civilization, a struggle that express the ambivalence within each culture as it faces a global, networked, material future and wonders whether cultural and national autonomy can be retreated; the ambivalence within each individual juggling the obvious benefits of modernity with its equally obvious costs. (p. 249)

The argument laid out in what follows then proposes that both Jihad and McWorld undermine the sovereignty of nations states, dismantling the democratic institutions that have been their finest achievement without discovering ways to extend democracy either downwards to the subnational religious and ethnic entities that now lay claim to people’s loyalty or upwords to the international sector in which McWorld’s pop culture and commercial markets operate without sovereign restraints. (p. 251)

[T]he decision that would-be sovereign peoples face today it [sic, is?] not the felicitous choice between secure independence and an unwanted interdependence, it is only the sobering choice between, on the one hand, a relatively legitimate and democratic and useful interdependence which, however, is still to be constructed and which leaves sovereignty in tatters; and, on the other hand, a radically illegitimate and undemocratic interdependence that is already here and which will triumph in the absence of a democratizing political will.

In short, we can allow either McWorld and [sic] Jihad --- Hollywood cowboys and international desperadoes --- to set the terms of our interdependence; or we can leave those terms to transnational treaties, new global democratic bodies and a new creative common will. We can have our interactivity dictated to us by violence and anarchy or we can construct it on the model of our own democratic aspirations. We can have a democratic and useful interdependence on whatever common ground we can persuade others to stand on, or we can stand on the brink of anarchy and try to prevent criminals and terrorists from pushing us into the abyss. (pp. 252-253)

The war between Jihad and McWorld cannot be own. Only a struggle of democracy against not only Jihad but also against McWorld can achieve a just victory for the planet. A just, diverse, democratic world will put commerce and consumerism back in its place and make space for religion; it will combat the terrors of Jihad not by making war on it but by creating a world in which the practice of religion is as secure as the practice of consumption and in which the defense of cultural values is not in tension with liberty but part of how liberty is defined. --- In a democratic world order, there will be no need for militant Jihad because belief will have a significant place; and there will be no advantage to McWorld because cultural variety will confront it on every television station and at every mall, the world over. (p. 262)

Chapter 23, Jean Bethke Elshtain, “How to Fight a Just War”

From President George W. Bush to the average man and woman on the street, Americans since September 11 have evoked the language of justice to characterize their collective response to the despicable deeds perpetrated against innocent men, women and children on September 11. When they do this, they tap into a complex tradition called ‘just war.’ The origins of the just war tradition are usually traced back to St Augustine’s fourth-century masterwork, The City of God. In that great text, Augustine grapples with the undeniable anti-violence of Christian teaching. He comes to the conclusion that wars of aggression and aggrandizement are never acceptable. But there are occasions when resort to force may be tragically necessary although violence is never a normative good. (p. 263)

The upshot of Augustine’s reflection, refined over time, is that a primary rule for those committed to just war is non-combatant immunity or the so-called discrimination, meaning that non-combatants must not be the intended targets of violence. A further implication is that a carefully worked out and unprovoked act of terror against non-combatants of one’s own country is an injury --- an act of war --- that demands a response. That response involves just punishment, not in order to inflict grievous harm on the non-combatants of a country whose operatives have harmed your citizens but to interdict in order to prevent further harm and to punish those responsible for the harm that has already occurred. In so doing, one reaffirms a world of moral responsibility and justice. (pp. 263-264)

When a wound as grievous as that of September 11 has been inflicted on a body politic, it would be the height of irresponsibility --- a dereliction of duty, a flight from the serious vocation of politics --- to fail to respond. --- A political ethic is an ethic of responsibility. The just war tradition offers the way to exercise that responsibility. This way of thinking rejects both the ‘anything goes’ ethic of Machiavellian realpolitik and an ethic that forswears action if that action takes the form of coercion and commits a country to the use of armed force in a responsible and limited way. (p. 264)

The aim of terrorism is terror. The terrorists did not issue a set of demands. They did not demand negotiation or else. They simply murdered. That is why one does not negotiate. There is nothing to negotiate about. Thus the talking ends and the call for responsible action begins. (p. 267)

[T]he numbers of those who support action against terrorism begin to waver when the question is put as to whether this force would be acceptable if ‘innocent men, women and children’ are the victims. No war, ---, can be fought without putting non-combatants in harm’s way, but the American people favour doing everything possible to limit this damage. (p. 267)

It is a vital concern that the entire world should stop those who use civilians against other civilians by turning a great symbol of human freedom of movement --- the commercial airplane --- into a deadly bomb. To this end, it is necessary to cut off terrorist finances, to decode their messages, to disrupt their networks and, finally, to interdict and punish the terrorists themselves --- means that are consistent with just war constraints. The US is prepared to put its combatants in harm’s way to punish those who put American non-combatants in harm’s way and have no compunction about mass murder. That is the burden of the just warrior. And that is his or her --- and a nation’s --- honour. (pp. 267-268)

Chapter 24, Bhikhu Parekh, “Terrorism or Intercultural Dialogue”

How should we respond to terrorist attacks of the kind that occurred on September 11? The question has received several answers, of which two are most influential. First, some argue that the perpetrators of these evil acts are callous and inhuman monsters driven by a blind hatred of the West, especially the United States. Since they are non-state agents, they are strictly speaking not at war with us, but they are most certainly in a state of war with us. We have a duty to defend ourselves and to do everything in our power to put them out of action. We cannot reason with them because they are not rational beings but nihilists determined to inflict maximum harm to us. The only language they understand is that of force.

Second, some argue that while terrorist acts deserve to be punished or pre-empted, we also need to look at their contexts and causes. They do not occur in a historical and moral vacuum. Their agents are human beings like the rest of us, a mixture of good and evil, and do not enjoy throwing away their lives and turning their wives into widows and children into orphans. They risk their lives in terrorist acts because they feel humiliated, trampled upon, unjustly treated, and see no other way of redressing their grievances. Rather than concentrate only on their reprehensible deeds, we must address their deeper causes. We should not put terrorists outside the pale of rational discourse but engage in a dialogue with them, understand their grievances, see if they are genuine, ask ourselves whether we bear any responsibility for these, mend our ways when we think we do and, when we don’t, persuade them why they need to put their own house in order. Although such a dialogue is not easy against the background of spectacular terrorist acts, it is absolutely essential. ---

Of the two, the first response, though understandable, is deeply flawed. --- This reduces us to their level and weakens our moral authority to condemn them, for although our ends are infinitely superior our methods are the same. If terrorism is reprehensible, anti-terrorist terrorism is no better. (pp. 270-271)

The initial response of the United Sates government to the event of September 11 was mature and belonged to the second type. While condemning the attacks and vowing to bring their perpetrators to justice, its spokesmen appreciated the need to address their deeper causes. Increasingly the United Sates government began to veer towards the first response and in now firmly committed to it. ---

As one would expect in these circumstances, the US government’s rhetoric and behaviour are sadly beginning to display a remarkable resemblance to those of the terrorists. The latter call the United States an evil civilization; the United States says the same to them. They say they are fighting for ‘eternal moral verities,’ the United States says it is fighting for values that are ‘right and unchanging for all people everywhere.’ They say that every state working in league with the United States is a legitimate target; the United States says the same. Terrorists aim to create global fear by demonstrating that even the centres of American financial and military power are not beyond their reach; the United States aims to do the same. Both claim divine blessings for their respective projects; both talk of a clash of civilizations, a long and bitter war, and a fight to the finish; both want to stand and act alone, are driven by rage and hatred, and claim absolute superiority for their respective ways of life.

All this goes to show how mistaken it is to adopt the first, punitive approach and to see terrorism as a exclusively military problem. The United Sates ends up becoming the mirror image of its enemy and profoundly corrupting the integrity of its way of life. It is led to cut legal and moral concerns, to violate the rule of law, to authorize intelligence agencies to do things that transgress international norms, to interfere in the national lives of vulnerable states, to militarize the psyche of its own people, and to encourage dangerous passions. --- [S]uch methods rarely succeed in achieving their objectives and only end up escalating the spiral of violence. Given its fairly extensive list of terror-sponsoring states, the United States also risks getting dragged into wars on many different fronts, making enemies, provoking widespread hostility, and so on --- precisely what it needs to avoid and what the terrorists desperately desire. (pp. 272-273)

I suggest that the only effective way to counter terrorism is to adopt the second type approach outlined above. Potential terrorists and their sponsors or supporters must obviously be deterred by all legitimate means, including carefully gathered intelligence, financial squeeze, domestic vigilance and, when necessary, a judicious use of force. At the same time we must also address the deeper roots of terrorism that drive otherwise decent men and women to build up enormous rage and hatred, and so blunt their moral sensibilities that they cannot see anything wrong in taking innocent lives. --- If we are to tackle the roots of terrorism, we need to enter their world of thought, understand their grievances and explore why they think we bear responsibility for these.

This calls for a dialogue between Western and non-Western societies, especially Muslim societies whose sense of injustice is the most acute and form which almost all the recent terrorists have sprung. The point of the dialogue is to deepen mutual understanding, to expand sympathy and imagination, to exchange not only arguments but also sensibilities, to take a critical look at oneself, to build up mutual trust, and to arrive at a more balanced view of both the contentious issues and the world in general. (pp. 273-274)

The dialogue is necessarily multistranded and at various levels. It is obviously about substantive economic, political and other issues, the immediate causes of conflict and violence. Since all such issues have historical roots and are embedded in historical memories, the dialogue also has an inescapable historical dimension, and involves arriving at a broadly agreed view of the past. And since human beings define their interests and identities and their relations with others from within their culture, the dialogue has a strong cultural component as well. --- The dialogue between Western and Muslim societies thus moves freely between substantive issues and their historical interpretations and cultural contexts, and is necessarily complex and messy. (pp. 274-275)

Contrary to the current rhetoric there can be no clash between cultures or civilizations. Cultures do not speak or fight; rather, people speak and fight from within and about their cultures. Cultures, further, are not homogeneous wholes and contain different strands and currents of thought. Cultures or civilizations therefore do not clash, only their particular strands and interpretations do. There is no inherent clash between Islam and the West. (p. 275)

Since all societies are internally diverse, we should not homogenize them, generalize about them, or allow anyone the sole authority to speak for them. Furthermore, they all have admirable and abominable qualities, this being as true of the Western as of Muslim societies, and none should be demonize or declared ‘evil.’ For that very reason, each needs to be critical of itself and avoid the deadly vices of self-righteousness and moral arrogance. (pp. 275-276)

The dialogue at the cultural level is the most challenging, but it cannot be avoided. While some contentious issues can be tackled by themselves, others cannot, and even the former will not have a lasting solution unless they are embedded in better intercultural understanding. Our hope here is that Western and Muslim societies (as well as all others) will avoid the interrelated vices of narcissism and demonization of the other, will appreciate each other’s strengths and inadequacies, and will develop over time a shared global perspective in which deep differences are admitted but not allowed to get out of control. (p. 282)

Chapter 26, Chris Brown, “Narratives of Religion, Civilization and Modernity”

It should be noted that neither side in this conflict is a ‘clash of civilizations’ in Samuel Huntington’s terms, taking place ---. Neither the Coalition against Terror nor the al-Qaeda network regard each other as civilized. (p. 296)

The very extensive use of video technology and the internet, and the sophisticated management of relations with the Arabic-language TV station al-Jazeera, suggests a decidedly unprimitive sense of public relations. --- [T]he narrative of the modern and the primitive collapses --- if al-Qaeda were genuinely primitive we would not have heard of them, or certainly not in the way in which they have made themselves known to the world at large. Rather, Osama bin Laden is as modern a figure as Tony Blair, but represents a different kind of modernity. (p. 298)

[A]re the forces of radical Islam doomed to be defeated, and, if not, what can be done to bring about such a defeat? If they actually were primitive, then it would be possible to believe that the tide of history will, eventually, leave them stranded --- and much Western thinking seems to make this assumption. But if they represent an alternative modernity then no such guarantee is available. Fascism and National Socialism did not collapse of their own contradictions, but rather succumbed to superior force after a struggle that, had it been in a better cause, one would have to describe as heroic. The willingness of al-Qaeda to continue fighting when all is lost can be seen in this light. Therefore, the opponents of Islamo-fascism have to be prepared to fight for what they believe in, and the intelligent use of military force will, inevitably, be one component of the struggle. (p. 300)

Chapter 27, Andrew Linklater, “Unnecessary Suffering”

The events of September 11 have raised large questions for a world which made important progress in the twentieth century in making avoidable suffering a moral problem for humanity as a whole. --- A crucial --- perhaps the central --- question raised by September 11 is whether the vision of a world in which fewer human beings are burdened with preventable suffering has been dealt a blow from which it will not easily recover. (p. 304)

[M]odern war must be fought (or be believed to be fought) with great respect for moral constraints than in the past. The just war tradition has long argued that civilian deaths are morally defensible as long as the level stands in proportion to the goals for which the war is fought, although deciding the level of acceptable civilian casualties has never been an exact science. There is now reason that informed Western publics are less willing than ever to believe official pronouncements on proportionality and less inclined to tolerate what they think is the unnecessary suffering of civilians. (p. 305)

We have to ask how far legitimate efforts to combat terrorism have jeopardized other values of importance. These include the duty to protect individuals from violence and unnecessary suffering in war, from human rights violations caused by their own governments, from demeaning representations whether they originate inside or outside their societies, and from the harmful consequences of general indifference to poverty and disadvantage. We need to ask how far the discourse of war against criminality has damaged the ideal of a world legal order that upholds the ideal of justice between cultures, how far an alliance with unsavory regimes has damaged Western claims to be custodians of human rights, how far claims that the coalition is not engaged in demeaning Islam and the suggestion that the majority of Muslims have more in common with Western liberals than with the exponents of ‘paranoid Islam’ suggest will prevail, how far anything will be done to reduce global inequalities and to deal with environmental harm, and, finally, how far the affluent West can escape the charge of indifference to the poor and to the plight of the Palestinians. These are the larger values at stake in the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. (p. 309)

There is no doubt that the question of whether the West can develop a form of global governance which is legitimate in the eyes of the majority of non-Western peoples has returned to centre stage because of September 11. Therefore, when the critics of the language of the war against evil stress the need to prevent unnecessary suffering to civilians, they draw attention to an issue which will have a decisive influence on the future of relations between liberal and non-liberal world. When they stress the need for a deeper understanding between the West and Islam, and when they call for a closer ‘dialogue of civilizations,’ they highlight issues which are at the centre of any decent vision of a more just world order embracing a world of unusual cultural differences and unprecedented global inequalities. (p. 311)

Important currents of thought have reaffirmed the ideal of a world order in which unnecessary suffering is a moral problem for humanity as a whole. This is about ensuring that humane values are not compromised in the war against illiberalism and about preserving ? especially in moments of crisis --- the cosmopolitan ideal of a world evolving towards the eradication of unnecessary human suffering. (pp. 311-312)

Chapter 28, Saskia Sassen, “Governance Hotspots: Challenges We Must Confront in the Post-September 11 World”

Here I address what have emerged as two difficult governance hotspots in this larger context of challenge. Examining them is a way of discussing the nature of the challenge and identifying specific governance deficits. The two issues are, first, the debt trap in which a growing number of governments are caught and which leads to, among other things, a sharp growth in illegal trafficking of people; and, second, immigration, a process caught in a whole series of new contradictions. Both of these will require innovations in our conceptions of governance. Both show that as the world is more interconnected, we will need more multilateralism and internationalism, but that these will have to consist of multiple and often highly specialized cross-border governance regimes, and that simply relying on overarching institutions will not do. --- [I]t is clear that new forms of collaboration with civil society and supranational institutions are part of this effort. --- The policy this leads to is one that emphasizes the mutual interests of the global south and north and hence the desirability of multilateralism and internationalism. (p. 314)

After a decade of believing that markets could take care of more and more social domains, we must now accept that markets cannot take care of everything. (p. 316)

The events of September 11 have produced a new set of constraints and opportunities. Governments will have had to re-enter domains from which they had withdrawn. Forms of openness that had come to be considered crucial for a global economy --- such as enabling international business travel --- are now subject to new restrictions. We are seeing a re-nationalizing of government efforts to control their territory after a decade of liberalization. But we are also seeing new types of cross-border government coalitions, especially the US-led war on terrorism and the legal, police and surveillance actions this has entailed.

In an era of privatization and market rule we are facing the fact that governments will have to govern a bit. But it cannot be a return to old forms --- countries surrounding themselves with protective walls. I will take genuine multilateralism and internationalism and some radical innovations. ---

The world today faces new governance challenges. Growing interconnectedness has given new meaning to old asymmetries as well as creating new ones. Rising debt, poverty and disease in the global south are beginning to reach deep into the rich countries. Many of these conditions need to be addressed through fairly specialized and focused multilateral efforts. National governments will have to become involved, along with non-governmental actors and supranational organizations. (pp. 323-324)

Chapter 29, Richard Falk, “Testing Patriotism and Citizenship in the Global Terror War”

Why, ---, should there be concerns about the role of patriotism in this setting of responding 9/11? In essence, these concerns arise because waving the American flag so vigorously has made it more difficult to set limits on the response, and these limits are necessary for both pragmatic and normative reasons. It has seemed that the American leadership has itself been genuinely engulfed in this tidal wave of patriotic feelings, which is leading it to undertake a far wider war than is necessary given the scope of the threat. There has been a refusal by American leaders to define national goals and defensive responses with precision. This has lead to the adoption of foreign and domestic policies of a dubious and dangerous character that engage issues that are not really raised by the September 11 attacks. (p. 331)

In a globalizing world there is another way of being patriotic that reconciles love of country with responsibility to humanity: cosmopolitan patriotism. Such attitudes have started to form in the midst of the deterritorializing of economic, social and cultural life, and seem to have affected segments of public opinion in Europe. Cosmopolitan patriotism accepts the right of a people and a country to defend its fundamental rights, whether struggling for self-determination or dealing with aggressor. At the same time, such a patriotic outlook seems the self from without as well as from within and is receptive to criticism, and seek to live by the rule of law rather than to dominate by the rule of force. ---

Cosmopolitan patriotism combines love of humanity with love of country, and does not imply a renunciation of national identities or affinities. It is more alive to the degree to which globalization alters our sense of time and space than is its nationalist counterpart. National patriotism is premised on a world order that is decisively defined by autonomous sovereign states, each dependent for survival and prosperity on the successful exercise of its unconditional dependence on self-help. This dependence overrides any considerations of morality and law that may stand in the way of expedient action taken for the sake of survival and security. It inclines toward viewing an adversary as ‘evil’ and regarding it own reality as ‘good,’ especially under conditions of hostility and trauma. National patriotism does not perceive any dangers flowing from its own excess of power, whereas cosmopolitan patriotism seeks to substitute the security of community for the security associated with military capabilities. ---

The United States guided by the spirit of cosmopolitan patriotism could turn the tragedy of September 11 into an inspirational moment in the early history of the twenty-first century. At the moment such a prospect is as remote as landing a man on the moon must have seemed in the 1930s. As the old world order of states and wars is being transformed by networks and digital potency, we must reconceive politics as the art of the impossible. (pp. 334-445)

Chapter 31, Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Continuity of International Politics”

On the morning of September 11, 2001, terrorists toppled the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, symbols of world capitalism. They then struck a section of the Pentagon, symbols of America’s military might. Apparently organized by Osama bin Ladin and executed by members of al-Qaeda, the terrorist’s acts were roundly condemned worldwide. Yet one wonders how deep and lasting the impact on American policy and on international politics will be.

--- New challenges have not changed old habits. ---

Terrorists have caused America to change its policy and behavior in the near term, but the changes run in the direction that earlier policies had set. (pp. 248-249)

Since the Soviet Union’s disappearance, international politics has been marked by three basic facts. The first is the gross imbalance of power in the world. Never since Rome has one country so nearly dominated its world. ---

Terrorism does not change the first basic fact of international politics --- the gross imbalance of world power. Instead, the effect of September 11 has been to enhance American power and extend its military presence in the world.

The second basic fact of international politics is the existence of nuclear weapons, most of them in the hands of the United States, and their gradual spread to additional countries. Again, terror furthers trends already in being. ---

The third basic fact of international politics is the prevalence of crises that plague the world and in most of which the United States is directly or indirectly involved. ---

Terrorist do not change the third basic fact of international politics: the persistence and accumulation of crises. Indeed, by pursuing terrorists and threatening to attack states that harbor them the United States will add crisis to an already long list. ---

Rather than interrupting the continuity of international politics, increased terrorist activity is a response to changes that have taken place in the last two decades. (pp. 350-352)

Fortunately or not, terrorists contribute to the continuity of international politics. They further trends already in motion. Why, one may wonder, does the prospect of terror not change the basic facts of international politics? All states --- whether authoritarian or democratic, traditional or modern, religious or secular --- fear being their targets. Governments prize stability, and most of all they prize the continuation of their regimes. Terror is a threat to the stability of states and to the peace of mind of their rulers. That is why President Bush could so easily assemble a coalition a mile wide.

Yet the terror is a weapon wielded by the weak, terrorists do not seriously threaten the security of states. States are therefore not compelled to band together to shift the balance of world power. Terrorist attacks do not change the two [sic, three?] main bases of international politics or condition of recurring crises That is why, although a mile wide, the anti-terrorist coalition is only an inch deep. (p. 353)

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